

Cautious Uncertainty Modelling in Common-Cause Failure Models with Sets of Conjugate Priors

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Outline


- 1 Common-cause failure modelling
(joint work with Matthias Troffaes and Dana Kelly)
- 2 Generalised Bayesian inference with sets of conjugate priors
(joint work with Thomas Augustin)

Common-Cause Failures



Source: Wikimedia Commons, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fukushima_I_by_Digital_Globe.jpg

Common-Cause Failures



Source: <http://www.diakont.com/solutions/nuclear-energy/plant-systems/diesel-generator-control-systems/>

Source: Wikimedia Commons, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fukushima_I_by_Digital_Globe.jpg

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
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**Must include common-cause failures
in overall system reliability analysis**


Common-Cause Failure Models



Above: CDC, <http://phil.cdc.gov/phil/ID1194>

Right: Wikimedia Commons,

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Graphic_TMI-2_Core_End-State_Configuration.png



Basic Parameter Model

Basic Parameter Model (Mosleh et al. 1988)

- immediate repair
- failure events follow Poisson process
- system with k exchangeable components
- q_j : rate for failures involving *exact* j components ($j = 1, \dots, k$)
- $(q_1, \dots, q_k) =: \mathbf{q}$

$q_j \neq 0$ for $j \geq 2$: lack of independence for individual component failures

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\mathbf{q} is difficult to estimate directly:

- failure data often collected per component
 - sparse data on joint failures
- ▶ reparametrisation: alpha-factor model

Alpha-Factor Model

Total Failure Rate

$$q_t = \sum_{j=1}^k \binom{k-1}{j-1} q_j \quad (1)$$

total or marginal failure rate:
failure rate obtained by looking
just at single components

Alpha-Factors

$$\alpha_j = \frac{\binom{k}{j} q_j}{\sum_{\ell=1}^k \binom{k}{\ell} q_{\ell}} \quad (2)$$

probability of j of the k components
failing due to a common cause
given that failure occurs

$$q_j = \frac{1}{\binom{k-1}{j-1}} \frac{j \alpha_j}{\sum_{\ell=1}^k \ell \alpha_{\ell}} q_t \quad (3)$$

$$\mathbf{q} \iff (q_t, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_k)$$

Data

observed per-component
failure rates to estimate q_t

Data

common-cause failure counts
to estimate $(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_k)$

Total Failure Rate: Data Model & Parameter Estimation

Poisson Process for Observed Per-Component Failures

$$p(M | q_t, T) = \frac{(q_t T)^M e^{-q_t T}}{M!} \quad (4)$$

where

- **total failure rate** q_t
- **number of per-component (i.e. marginal) failures** M := total number of component failures occurred (two-component failure = two failures, ...)
- **time under risk** T := sum of time elapsed for each of the components

Estimation of q_t

usually immediately possible: use, e.g., maximum likelihood estimator

$$\hat{q}_t = \frac{M}{T} \quad (5)$$

Alpha-Factors: Data Model & Parameter Estimation

Multinomial Distribution for Common-Cause Failure Counts

$$p(\mathbf{n} | \alpha) = \prod_{j=1}^k \alpha_j^{n_j} \quad (6)$$

where

- **alpha-factor** α_j := probability of j of the k components failing due to a common cause given that failure occurs
- **failure count** n_j := corresponding number of failures observed
- \mathbf{n} denotes (n_1, \dots, n_k) and α denotes $(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_k)$

Estimation of α

maximum likelihood estimator:

$$\hat{\alpha}_j = \frac{n_j}{n}, \quad \text{where } \sum_{j=1}^k n_j = n$$

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- typically, for $j \geq 2$, the n_j are very low with zero being quite common for larger j
- zero counts = flat likelihoods $\rightarrow \hat{\alpha}_j = ?$

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\rightarrow need to rely on **epistemic information**: Bayesian inference

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Bayesian inference procedure

prior + likelihood \rightarrow posterior

using Bayes' Rule

All inferences are based on the posterior

Bayesian Inference: Dirichlet Prior

α considered as uncertain parameter on which we put...

Dirichlet Distribution (\rightarrow Dirichlet-Multinomial Model)

$$p(\alpha \mid \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) \propto \prod_{j=1}^k \alpha_j^{\mathbf{s}t_j - 1}$$

where (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})
are *hyperparameters*

$$\mathbf{s} > 0$$

$$\mathbf{t} \in \Delta = \left\{ (t_1, \dots, t_k) : t_1 \geq 0, \dots, t_k \geq 0, \sum_{j=1}^k t_j = 1 \right\}$$

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Interpretation

- \mathbf{t} = prior expectation of α , i.e., a prior guess for $\frac{n_j}{n}$, $j = 1, \dots, n$
- \mathbf{s} = determines spread and learning speed (see next slide)

Dirichlet Posterior

- posterior density for α is again Dirichlet (\rightarrow conjugacy):

$$p(\alpha \mid \mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) \propto \prod_{j=1}^k \alpha_j^{s_j + n_j - 1} \quad (7)$$

- posterior expectation of α_j :

$$E[\alpha_j \mid \mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}] = \int_{\Delta} \alpha_j p(\alpha \mid \mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) d\alpha = \frac{s}{s+n} t_j + \frac{n}{s+n} \cdot \frac{n_j}{n} \quad (8)$$

we will focus on $E[\alpha_j \mid \mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}]$

(in a decision context, this expectation would typically end up in expressions for expected utility)

Example: Epistemic Information and Data

Example (from Kelly and Atwood 2011)

Consider a system with four redundant components ($k = 4$).

The analyst specifies the following prior expectation $\mu_{\text{spec},j}$ for each α_j :

$$\mu_{\text{spec},1} = 0.950 \quad \mu_{\text{spec},2} = 0.030 \quad \mu_{\text{spec},3} = 0.015 \quad \mu_{\text{spec},4} = 0.005 \quad (9)$$

We have 36 observations, in which 35 showed one component failing, and 1 showed two components failing:

$$n_1 = 35 \quad n_2 = 1 \quad n_3 = 0 \quad n_4 = 0 \quad (10)$$

Non-Informative Priors

large variation in posterior under different non-informative priors

- with constrained maximum entropy prior (Atwood 1996; Kelly and Atwood 2011):

$$E[\alpha_1 | \mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}] = 0.967$$

$$E[\alpha_2 | \mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}] = 0.028$$

$$E[\alpha_3 | \mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}] = 0.003$$

$$E[\alpha_4 | \mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}] = 0.001$$

- with uniform prior $t_j = 0.25$ and $s = 4$:

$$E[\alpha_1 | \mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}] = 0.9$$

$$E[\alpha_2 | \mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}] = 0.05$$

$$E[\alpha_3 | \mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}] = 0.025$$

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- with Jeffreys' prior $t_j = 0.25$ and $s = 2$:

$$E[\alpha_1 | \mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}] = 0.9342$$

$$E[\alpha_2 | \mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}] = 0.0395$$

$$E[\alpha_3 | \mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}] = 0.0132$$

$$E[\alpha_4 | \mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}] = 0.0132$$

Imprecise Dirichlet Model: Definition

Troffaes, Walter, and Kelly (2014):
model vague prior info more cautiously

Imprecise Dirichlet Model (IDM) for Common-Cause Failure

use a set of hyperparameters (Walley 1991; Walley 1996)

$$\mathcal{H} = \{(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) : \mathbf{s} \in [\underline{\mathbf{s}}, \overline{\mathbf{s}}], \mathbf{t} \in \Delta, t_j \in [\underline{t}_j, \overline{t}_j]\}$$

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- we are doing a **sensitivity analysis** (à la robust Bayes) over $(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) \in \mathcal{H}$
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Analyst has to specify ('elicit')
bounds $[\underline{\mathbf{s}}, \overline{\mathbf{s}}]$ and bounds $[\underline{t}_j, \overline{t}_j]$ for each $j \in \{1, \dots, k\}$

Imprecise Dirichlet Model: Elicitation

- $[\underline{t}_j, \bar{t}_j]$? Cautious interpretation of prior specifications $\mu_{\text{spec},j}$:

$$[\underline{t}_1, \bar{t}_1] = [0.950, 1]$$

$$[\underline{t}_2, \bar{t}_2] = [0, 0.030]$$

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\bar{s} = number of one-component failures required
to reduce the upper probabilities of multi-component failure by half

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Reasonable values in example:

- $\bar{s} = 10$: after observing 10 one-component failures
➔ halve upper probabilities of multi-component failures
- $\underline{s} = 1$: immediate multi-component failure
➔ keen to reduce lower probability for one-component failure

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Difference between \underline{s} and \bar{s} reflects a level of caution:

The rate at which we reduce upper probabilities is less than the rate at which we reduce lower probabilities

Imprecise Dirichlet Model: Inference

With $[\underline{s}, \bar{s}] = [1, 10]$, we get. . .

prior bounds + data \rightarrow posterior bounds

j	\underline{t}_j	\bar{t}_j	n_j	$\underline{E}[\alpha_j \mathbf{n}, \mathcal{H}]$	$\bar{E}[\alpha_j \mathbf{n}, \mathcal{H}]$
1	0.950	1	35	0.967	0.978
2	0	0.030	1	0.0270	0.0283
3	0	0.015	0	0	0.00326
4	0	0.005	0	0	0.00109

Gamma Prior and Posterior

q_t considered as uncertain parameter on which we put. . .

Gamma Distribution

$$p(q_t | u, v) \propto q_t^{uv-1} e^{-q_t u} \quad (11)$$

where (u, v) are hyperparameters with $u > 0$ and $v > 0$.

Interpretation

- v = prior expectation of q_t
- u = determines learning speed (just like s in the IDM)

- posterior density for q_t is again Gamma:

$$p(q_t | M, T, u, v) \propto q_t^{uv+M-1} e^{-q_t(u+T)} \quad (12)$$

- posterior expectation of q_t :

$$E[q_t | M, T, u, v] = \frac{u}{T+u} v + \frac{T}{T+u} \cdot \frac{M}{T} \quad (13)$$

Imprecise Gamma Model

use a set of hyperparameters:

$$= \left\{ (u, v) : u \in [\underline{u}, \bar{u}], v \in [\underline{v}, \bar{v}] \right\} \quad (14)$$

- $[\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$? Bounds for prior expectation of q_t should be easy to find (choosing $\underline{v} = 0$ is possible)
- $[\underline{u}, \bar{u}]$? Similar reasoning as for the IDM leads to...

\bar{u} = timespan for observing the process required to raise the lower expectation of q_t from 0 to half of observed failure rate $\frac{M}{T}$ ($\underline{v} = 0$ is assumed)

\underline{u} = timespan for observing the process *without any failures* required to reduce the lower expectation of q_t by half ($\underline{v} > 0$ is assumed)

$\underline{u} = \bar{u}$ can be reasonable here, as zero counts are less of an issue

Inference on Common-Cause Failure Rates q_j

combine our models for α and q_t by using Eq. (3):

$$q_j = g_j(\alpha)q_t \quad \text{where} \quad g_j(\alpha) = \frac{1}{\binom{k-1}{j-1}} \frac{j\alpha_j}{\sum_{\ell=1}^k \ell\alpha_\ell}$$

The Problem

no closed expression for $E[g_j(\alpha) | \dots]$ due to rational function of α

The Good News

naive approximation $\tilde{g}_j(\alpha)$ of $g_j(\alpha)$ by Taylor expansion works surprisingly well (absolute error term available)

$$E[q_j | \mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}; M, T, \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}] \approx E[\tilde{g}_j(\alpha) | \mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}] E[q_t | M, T, \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}] \quad (15)$$

(q_t and α are assumed to be independent)

Global Sensitivity Analysis

We can do a **global sensitivity analysis** for $E[q_j | \dots]$

→ bounds for $E[q_j | \dots]$ taking into account approximation error and *epistemic uncertainty expressed through* and :

$$\underline{E}[q_j | \mathbf{n}, M, T, \dots] \approx \underline{E}[\tilde{g}_j(\alpha) | \mathbf{n}, \dots] \underline{E}[q_t | M, T, \dots] \quad (16)$$

where

$$\underline{E}[\tilde{g}_j(\alpha) | \mathbf{n}, \dots] = \min_{(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) \in \dots} \underline{E}[\tilde{g}_j(\alpha) | \mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}] \quad (\text{by num. optimization}) \quad (17)$$

$$\underline{E}[q_t | M, T, \dots] = \min_{(\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}) \in \dots} E[q_t | M, T, \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}] \quad (\text{by closed form solution}) \quad (18)$$

Do the same for $\bar{E}[q_j | \mathbf{n}, M, T, \dots]$ by replacing min with max.

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(chosen to allow easy elicitation),
how does shape influence posterior inferences?
- is it possible to generalise this method to other problems?

Canonical Conjugate Priors

Multinomial, Poisson are examples for a **canonical exponential family**:

$(x_1, \dots, x_n) = \mathbf{x} \stackrel{iid}{\sim}$ canonical exponential family

$$p(\mathbf{x} | \theta) \propto \exp \left\{ \langle \boldsymbol{\psi}, \boldsymbol{\tau}(\mathbf{x}) \rangle - nb(\boldsymbol{\psi}) \right\} \quad \left[\boldsymbol{\psi} \text{ transformation of } \theta \right] \quad (19)$$

(includes also Binomial, Normal, Exponential, Dirichlet, Gamma, ...)

- ▶ conjugate prior: $p(\boldsymbol{\psi} | n^{(0)}, \mathbf{y}^{(0)}) \propto \exp \left\{ n^{(0)} \left[\langle \boldsymbol{\psi}, \mathbf{y}^{(0)} \rangle - b(\boldsymbol{\psi}) \right] \right\}$
- ▶ (conjugate) posterior: $p(\boldsymbol{\psi} | n^{(0)}, \mathbf{y}^{(0)}, \mathbf{x}) \propto \exp \left\{ n^{(n)} \left[\langle \boldsymbol{\psi}, \mathbf{y}^{(n)} \rangle - b(\boldsymbol{\psi}) \right] \right\}$

where $\mathbf{y}^{(n)} = \frac{n^{(0)}}{n^{(0)} + n} \cdot \mathbf{y}^{(0)} + \frac{n}{n^{(0)} + n} \cdot \frac{\boldsymbol{\tau}(\mathbf{x})}{n}$ and $n^{(n)} = n^{(0)} + n$

Interpretation

- $n^{(0)}$ = determines **spread** and **learning speed**
- $\mathbf{y}^{(0)}$ = **prior expectation** of $\boldsymbol{\tau}(\mathbf{x})/n$

Imprecision

Add **imprecision** as new modelling dimension:
Sets of priors model uncertainty in probability statements
and allow to better model partial or vague information on θ

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Interpretation

smaller sets = more precise probability statements

Lottery A

Number of winning tickets:
exactly known as 5 out of 100

$$\rightarrow P(\text{win}) = 5/100$$

Lottery B

Number of winning tickets:
not exactly known, supposedly
between 1 and 7 out of 100

$$\rightarrow P(\text{win}) = [1/100, 7/100]$$

Bayesian Inference with Sets of Conjugate Priors

Standard Bayesian inference procedure

prior + likelihood \rightarrow posterior

using Bayes' Rule

All inferences are based on the posterior

(e.g., point estimate $E[\psi \mid \mathbf{x}, n^{(0)}, \mathbf{y}^{(0)}] = E[\psi \mid n^{(n)}, \mathbf{y}^{(n)}]$)

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Let hyperparameters $(\mathbf{n}^{(0)}, \mathbf{y}^{(0)})$ vary in a set \rightarrow set of priors

Generalised Bayesian inference procedure

set of priors + likelihood \rightarrow set of posteriors

All inferences are based on the set of posteriors

(e.g., $\underline{E}[\psi | \mathbf{x}, \Pi^{(0)}], \bar{E}[\psi | \mathbf{x}, \Pi^{(0)}]$)

Coherence (consistency of inferences) ensured by using

Generalised Bayes' Rule (GBR, Walley 1991)

= element-wise application of Bayes' Rule

General Model Properties

Model framework has favourable inference properties (see Walter 2013, §3.1) and is very easy to handle:

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- \rightarrow is easy:

$$n^{(n)} = n^{(0)} + n \quad y^{(n)} = \frac{n^{(0)}}{n^{(0)} + n} y^{(0)} + \frac{n}{n^{(0)} + n} \cdot \frac{\tau(\mathbf{x})}{n} \quad (20)$$

General Model Properties


Model framework has favourable inference properties (see Walter 2013, §3.1) and is very easy to handle:

- Hyperparameter set $\eta^{(0)}$ defines set of priors $\mathcal{M}^{(0)}$
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- $\eta^{(n)}$ → $\eta^{(0)}$ is easy:


$$\eta^{(n)} = \eta^{(0)} + n \quad \mathbf{y}^{(n)} = \frac{n^{(0)}}{n^{(0)} + n} \mathbf{y}^{(0)} + \frac{n}{n^{(0)} + n} \cdot \frac{\tau(\mathbf{x})}{n} \quad (20)$$

- Often, optimising over $(\eta^{(n)}, \mathbf{y}^{(n)}) \in \mathcal{M}^{(n)}$ is also easy:
closed form solution for $\mathbf{y}^{(n)}$ = posterior ‘guess’ for $\frac{\tau(\mathbf{x})}{n}$
given $\eta^{(n)}$ has ‘nice’ shape (as used in the common-cause model)


Parameter Set Shapes



Parameter Set Shapes



Parameter Set Shapes



Parameter Set Shapes & Prior-Data Conflict

Prior-Data Conflict

- *informative prior beliefs* and *trusted data* (sampling model correct, no outliers, etc.) are in conflict
- “[...] the prior [places] its mass primarily on distributions in the sampling model for which the observed data is surprising” (Evans and Moshonov 2006)
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
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The Problem


Many Bayesian models are insensitive to prior-data conflict!

Scaled Normal Data $x \stackrel{iid}{\sim} N(\mu, 1): \mu \sim N(y^{(0)}, 1/n^{(0)})$


Set of priors: $y^{(0)} \in [3;4]$ and $n^{(0)} \in [1;25]$




Set of posteriors: $y^{(1)} \in [3.29;4]$ and $n^{(1)} \in [11;35]$



Set of priors: $y^{(0)} \in [3;4]$ and $n^{(0)} \in [1;25]$



Set of posteriors: $y^{(1)} \in [4.43;7.64]$ and $n^{(1)} \in [11;35]$



Conclusion

- Conjugate priors are a convenient tool for Bayesian inference but there are some pitfalls
 - ▶ Hyperparameters $n^{(0)}$, $y^{(0)}$ are easy to interpret and elicit
 - ▶ Averaging property makes calculations simple, but leads to inadequate model behaviour in case of prior-data conflict

Conclusion

- Conjugate priors are a convenient tool for Bayesian inference but there are some pitfalls
 - ▶ Hyperparameters $n^{(0)}, y^{(0)}$ are easy to interpret and elicit
 - ▶ Averaging property makes calculations simple, but leads to inadequate model behaviour in case of prior-data conflict
- Sets of conjugate priors maintain advantages & mitigate issues
 - ▶ Hyperparameter set shape is important
 - ▶ Reasonable choice: *rectangular* = $[\underline{n}^{(0)}, \bar{n}^{(0)}] \times [\underline{y}^{(0)}, \bar{y}^{(0)}]$
(Walter & Augustin 2009: *generalised iLUCK-models*, luck)
 - ▶ Bounds for hyperparameters are easy to interpret and elicit
 - ▶ Additional imprecision in case of prior-data conflict leads to **cautious inferences if, and only if, caution is needed**
 - ▶ Shape for more precision in case of strong prior-data agreement is in development (joint work with Frank Coolen and Miķ Bickis)

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